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Abstract
The armed conflict in Afghanistan since 2001 has raised manifold questions pertaining
to the humanitarian rules relative to the conduct of hostilities. In Afghanistan, as is
often the case in so-called asymmetric conflicts, the geographical and temporal
boundaries of the battlefield, and the distinction between civilians and fighters, are
increasingly blurred. As a result, the risks for both civilians and soldiers operating
in Afghanistan are high. The objective of this article is to assess whether – and if so
how much – the armed conflict in Afghanistan has affected the application and
interpretation of the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution –
principles that form the core of legal rules pertaining to the conduct of hostilities.
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For almost a decade the armed conflict in Afghanistan has been posing many
challenging questions for military personnel, international lawyers, and the hu-
manitarian community alike. Even today, hardly a day passes without news about
civilian casualties or losses among Afghan, International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF), and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) forces, or those of the armed
opposition.1 While it is in the nature of armed conflict that soldiers and fighters are
injured or killed, it should not be the case for civilians. One factor that has greatly
affected warfare in Afghanistan is the huge disparity of technological capacity and
military power between the parties to that conflict. The military might of the
United States and its allies has forced the armed opposition to adopt guerrilla
warfare geared to an endurance and attrition strategy.2 In accordance with this
strategy, the armed opposition tries to evade the classical battlefield by shifting the
hostilities from one location to another – often in proximity to civilians, and thus
blurring the lines of distinction between those who fight and persons taking no
active part in the hostilities. At the same time, an important part of contemporary
counterinsurgency strategy is to focus on, and to be in as close proximity as poss-
ible to, the civilian population.3 The blurring of distinctions goes hand in hand
with increased challenges for the parties to the conflict in identifying military ob-
jectives and applying the principles of proportionality and precaution. All this has
at times prompted attempts either to broaden certain concepts of international
humanitarian law (IHL), such as the definition of direct participation in hosti-
lities,4 or to otherwise limit its protective scope.5 Over time and with increasing
1 The armed opposition operating against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the
international military presence is commonly referred to as the ‘Taliban’, who describe themselves as the
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. This is a shorthand for a fragmented alliance between different groups
such as the Quetta Shura Taliban in Southern Afghanistan, Hezb-i Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) and Hezb-i
Islami Khalis in the east, and the Haqqani Network. See a description of non-state armed groups oper-
ating in Afghanistan by the Human Security Report Project (HSRP), Afghanistan Conflict Monitor,
available at: http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/armedgroups.html (last visited 22 March 2011).
2 Patrick Quinn, ‘Taliban leader: insurgents waging war of attrition’, in The Seattle Times, 15 November
2010, available at: http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2013436796_apasafghantali-
banmessage.html (last visited 15 March 2011). See also Ehsan Mehmood Khan, ‘A strategic perspective
on Taliban warfare’, in Small Wars Journal, 22 March 2010, available at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/
blog/2010/03/a-strategic-perspective-on-tal/ (last visited 15 March 2011).
3 See, e.g., Canadian Army, ‘Troops get close to Afghans’, 15 February 2011, available at: http://www.
army.forces.gc.ca/land-terre/news-nouvelles/story-reportage-eng.asp?id=5024 (last visited 15 March
2011); David Axe, ‘US-led alliance concentrates on Afghan population centers’, in Voice of America,
9 May 2011, available at http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/US-led-Alliance-in-Concentrates-
on-Afghan-Population-Centers-121518749.html (last visited 27 June 2011).
4 See Kenneth Watkin, ‘Opportunity lost: organized armed groups and the ICRC “Direct participation in
hostilities” interpretative guidance’, in New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol.
42, No. 3, 2010, pp. 641–695; Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Deconstructing direct participation in hostilities: the
constitutive elements’, in ibid., pp. 697–739; Bill Boothby, ‘“And for such time as”: the time dimension
to direct participation in hostilities’, in ibid., pp. 741–768.
5 For instance, with regard to combatant status of Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters and their detention see,
e.g., W. Hays Park, ‘Combatants’, in Michael N. Schmitt (ed.), The War in Afghanistan: A Legal Analysis,
US Naval War College International Law Studies, Vol. 85, Naval War College Press, Newport, RI, 2009,
pp. 269–275. For a critique of the collective denial of prisoner-of-war status and an analysis of the legal
bases of detention see Ste´phane Ojeda, ‘US detention of Taliban fighters: some legal considerations’, in
ibid., pp. 360–369.
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civilian casualties, however, it has turned out that the tendency to limit the pro-
tective scope of IHL has proved contrary to the achievement of the long-term
strategic goals. As a result, policy and operational considerations have led to the
adoption of rules of engagement that in some aspects are more restrictive than
what would be required by IHL.6
The article proceeds in several steps. First, the different stages of the armed
conflict taking place in Afghanistan since 2001 are classified. This step is important
for identifying the legal framework governing the ongoing hostilities. Second, it
assesses whether the asymmetric nature of the armed conflict in Afghanistan has
affected IHL, in particular the interpretation and application of the rules relative to
the conduct of hostilities. This analysis focuses on the concepts of distinction,
proportionality, and precautions, and uses the challenges faced by the international
military forces as a case study. Third, the article sheds some light on the sometimes
difficult distinction between the law enforcement paradigm and the paradigm of
hostilities in certain operations. One example where these two paradigms poten-
tially overlap is provided by (vehicle) checkpoints, which are an important security
measure in Afghanistan. Finally, the article looks at possible challenges, and ad-
vantages, that new technologies may present in the conduct of hostilities. Especially
in recent years, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – that is, drones – have been
employed in Afghanistan for surveillance purposes but also increasingly for the
actual conduct of hostilities, namely in the context of so-called targeted killings.
The legal qualification of the Afghan conflict, 2001–2011
The situation in Afghanistan is complex, not only from a factual but also
from a legal perspective. Several parties have been involved in the conflict
since 2001 and it is today widely accepted that this conflict can be divided
into a phase of international armed conflict between the US-led Coalition
(OEF) and the Taliban governing Afghanistan, lasting from 7 October 2001
to 18 June 2002,7 followed by an ‘internationalized’ non-international armed
6 For instance: ‘Prior to the use of fires, the commander approving the strike must determine that no
civilians are present. If unable to assess the risk of civilian presence, fires are prohibited, except under
[one] of the following two conditions (specific conditions deleted due to operational security; however,
they have to do with the risk to ISAF and Afghan forces).’ See ISAF, General Petraeus issues updated
tactical directive: emphasizes ‘disciplined use of force’, News Release, 2010-08-CA-004, Kabul, 4 August
2010, available at: http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/general-petraeus-issues-updated-tactical-
directive-emphasizes-disciplined-use-of-force.html (last visited 15 March 2011).
7 See S. Ojeda, above note 5, pp. 358–359. In accordance with the jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), an international armed conflict exists ‘whenever
there is a resort to armed force between States’. See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic´, Decision on the
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Appeals Chamber), 2 October 1995, para. 70.
According to the commentary to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, an international armed conflict takes
place whenever there is ‘Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of
armed forces’. Jean S. Pictet (ed.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Commentary, Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field,
Geneva, ICRC, 1952, p. 32.
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conflict8 since 19 June 2002, in which the new Afghan government, supported
by ISAF and OEF forces, fights the armed opposition.9 This conflict phase still
continues today.
International armed conflict before 19 June 2002
Active hostilities in Afghanistan began with air strikes against the Taliban on
7 October 2001 as part of ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’, a US-led military cam-
paign directed against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan as a response to the
11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.10 Although only a few
states recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan at the
time, it is widely agreed that they represented the de facto Afghan government11
because they controlled the majority of Afghanistan’s territory, passed and en-
forced decrees, and provided a certain (however questionable) degree of ‘security’
in the areas that they controlled.12 The fall of Mazar-i Sharif on 9 November 2001
marked the decline of the Taliban rule, and when Northern Alliance forces entered
Kabul on 13 November,13 followed by the fall of Kandahar on 7 December,14 the
majority of the Taliban were believed to have disbanded.15 This decline of the
8 Note that this expression does not depict a ‘third’ type of armed conflict but covers non-international
armed conflicts with an ‘international’ dimension. The expression is used in situations where a state (or a
multinational force) becomes a party to a pre-existing non-international armed conflict. Such an in-
tervention may result in three outcomes: (1) the existing armed conflict remains a non-international
armed conflict if a state or multinational force supports another state against the armed opposition; (2)
the armed conflict is transformed into an international armed conflict if the acts of the armed opposition
can be attributed to the intervening state or multinational force; or (3) it develops into a ‘mixed conflict’,
where the relations between the parties are governed in part by the rules of international armed conflict
and in part by those of non-international armed conflict.
9 S. Ojeda, above note 5, pp. 359–360.
10 Operation Enduring Freedom was based upon UN Security Council resolution 1368 of 12 September
2001, recognizing the individual and collective right of self-defence in accordance with the UN Charter,
condemning the ‘terrorist attacks’ in the United States, and regarding them as a threat to international
peace and security. In addition, NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which considers
an armed attack against one or more NATO parties as an attack against all of them. See Article 5 of the
North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949; NATO Update, ‘Invocation of Article 5 confirmed’, 2 October
2001, available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1001/e1002a.htm (last visited 14 March 2011).
See also ‘7 October 2001: US launches air strikes against Taleban’, in BBC, ‘On this day’, 7 October 2001,
available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/7/newsid_2519000/2519353.stm
(last visited 22 March 2011).
11 Only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates recognized the Taliban as de jure govern-
ment. For a discussion of their recognition, see Ru¨diger Wolfrum and Christine E. Phillip, ‘The status of
the Taliban: their obligations and rights under international law’, in J. A. Frowein and R. Wolfrum (eds),
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol. 6, 2002, pp. 571–577 and 584–586.
12 Ibid., p. 566; see also Report of the Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for
international peace and security, 17 August 2001, UN Doc. S/2001/789.
13 John Simpson, ‘Eyewitness: the liberation of Kabul’, in BBC News, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/south_asia/1654353.stm (last visited 10 March 2011).
14 ‘7 December 2001: Taleban surrender Kandahar’, in BBC ‘On this day’, available at: http://news.
bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/7/newsid_4031000/4031711.stm (last visited 22 March
2011).
15 See Barbie Dutter and Stephen Robinson, ‘Reign of the Taliban is over’, in The Telegraph, 7 December
2001, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1364622/Reign-of-the-
Taliban-is-over.html (last visited 22 March 2011).
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Taliban then cleared the way for the establishment of a new transitional govern-
ment. The legal discussion during this conflict phase focused mainly on questions
relating to the status of enemy fighters and the status and treatment of detainees.16
Non-international armed conflict from 19 June 2002 onwards
In accordance with the Bonn Agreement of 5 December 2001, the emergency Loya
Jirga established the Afghan Transitional Administration on 19 June 2002 and
elected Hamid Karzai as the new head of government recognized by the inter-
national community.17 At this point, the international armed conflict came to an
end because it no longer opposed two or more states.18 However, hostilities soon
resumed as the armed opposition adapted to the new situation.19 Since then the
hostilities have been taking place in various locations and to various degrees be-
tween the new Afghan government with the support of ISAF20 and OEF forces on
the one hand, and the armed opposition on the other. The organisation of the
armed opposition, and the hostilities, have reached such a level that one can safely
admit the existence of a non-international armed conflict to which Common
Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Common Article 3) and cus-
tomary IHL (relevant to this threshold) apply.21
Since Afghanistan ratified Additional Protocol II on 10 November 2009,
the hostilities between the Afghan National Army and the armed opposition could
16 On this discussion see, inter alia, Jelena Pejic, ‘“Unlawful/enemy combatants”: interpretation and
consequences’, in Michael N. Schmitt and Jelena Pejic (eds), International Law and Armed Conflict:
Exploring the Faultlines – Essays in Honour of Yoram Dinstein, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2007,
pp. 335–336; Gabor Rona, ‘Legal issues in the “war on terrorism”: reflecting on the conversation between
Silja N.U. Voneky and John Bellinger’, in German Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 5, 2008, pp. 711–736.
17 See UN Security Council resolution 1419 (2002), of 26 June 2002, welcoming the election of Hamid
Karzai. See also Report of the Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for
international peace and security, 11 July 2002, UN Doc. S/2002/737. The International Conference on
Afghanistan held in December 2001 let to the ‘Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan
Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions (“Bonn Agreement”)’, S/2001/
1154, of 5 December 2001, establishing an interim authority and calling for the establishment of an
emergency Loya Jirga. See Lucy Morgan Edwards, ‘State-building in Afghanistan: a case showing the
limits?’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 92, No. 880, 2010, pp. 967–991; Norah Niland,
‘Impunity and insurgency: a deadly combination in Afghanistan’, in ibid., pp. 931–950.
18 For the opinion expressed in 2009 that the nature of the conflict between the Coalition states and the
armed opposition has not changed, i.e. that the conflict remains an international armed conflict, see, e.g.,
Yoram Dinstein, ‘Terrorism and Afghanistan’, in M. N. Schmitt, above note 5, pp. 51–53.
19 See Report of the Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international
peace and security, 18 March 2002, UN Doc. S/2002/278, paras. 45–54.
20 For the mandate of ISAF see in particular UN Security Council resolution 1386 of 20 December 2001;
UN Security Council resolution 1510 of 13 October 2003; and UN Security Council resolution 1890 of 8
October 2009.
21 A clear and uniform definition of what constitutes a non-international armed conflict does not exist in
international law. However, it is generally accepted that the existence of such a conflict is based on
objective criteria, namely the intensity of the violence and the organization of the parties. For a de-
scription of the threshold criteria, see International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), How is the
Term ‘Armed Conflict’ Defined in International Humanitarian Law?, ICRC Opinion Paper, March 2008,
available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf (last visited
22 March 2011).
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possibly be governed by this Protocol also. This would require the armed oppo-
sition to control at least part of Afghanistan in a way that enables them to ‘carry out
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement [Additional
Protocol II]’.22 The armed opposition seems to have succeeded in establishing a
‘shadow government’ throughout Afghanistan, where they control parts of the
Afghan population and are operating courts.23 This factual background militates in
favour of applying Additional Protocol II between the armed opposition and the
Afghan government armed forces.
In this regard it is questionable whether other states are bound by the
provisions of Additional Protocol II with respect to the conflict in Afghanistan.
Certainly, the Protocol cannot directly bind states that, like the US, have not rati-
fied it.24 Furthermore, the wording of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II suggests
that it applies only to armed conflicts between the contracting state and opposing
non-state parties that control part of that state’s territory.25 It thus seems that states
other than Afghanistan that are party to the armed conflict are not directly bound
by Additional Protocol II either, even if they have ratified it. Notwithstanding,
every party to the conflict has to comply with those rules that have attained cus-
tomary law status.26
The legal framework applicable to all parties to the armed conflict in
Afghanistan is thus Common Article 3, as well as customary IHL applicable in non-
international armed conflicts. In addition, the armed conflict between the
government of Afghanistan and the armed opposition is governed by the rules of
Additional Protocol II. The discrepancy that results from the application of
Additional Protocol II only between the armed opposition and Afghanistan is,
however, relatively marginal. Most provisions of Additional Protocol II have ac-
quired customary law status and therefore apply also to other states party to the
armed conflict in Afghanistan. With regard to the geographical scope of appli-
cation of IHL it is important to stress that these rules are not limited to the area
where active hostilities take place and hence apply to the entire Afghan territory.27
22 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims on Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, Article 1.
23 See David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2009, pp. 47–48 and 49–50. See also Griff Witte, ‘Taliban shadow officials offer
concrete alternative’, in The Washington Post, 8 December 2009; Anand Gopal, ‘Some Afghans live under
Taliban rule – and prefer it’, in The Christian Science Monitor, 15 October 2008, available at: http://
www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2008/1015/p01s01-wosc.html (last visited 22 March
2011).
24 See Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, expressing the general
rule that ‘a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without consent’.
25 See Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II, stating: ‘This Protocol … shall apply to all armed con-
flicts … which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces
and … organized armed groups which … exercise … control over a part of its territory …’ (emphasis
added).
26 See Article 38 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
27 See, e.g., ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic´, above note 7, paras. 86 and 89; International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Decision of
2 September 1998, paras. 635 and 636.
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Afghanistan: an asymmetric armed conflict
One of the major challenges of the armed conflict in Afghanistan is the significant
discrepancy of military power and technological capacity between the international
military/ISAF forces on the one hand and the armed opposition on the other.
Afghanistan has thus become the paradigmatic example of an asymmetric armed
conflict.28
Of course, ‘asymmetric warfare’ is a multifaceted notion. No common
understanding exists, much less a clear-cut definition of what ‘asymmetric warfare’
means. Some have even argued that the concept of asymmetry has been ‘twisted
beyond utility’.29 Be that as it may, in legal doctrine the phrase ‘asymmetric warfare’
is commonly used as descriptive shorthand for the changing structures of modern
armed conflicts and for the corresponding challenges that this development poses
for the application of IHL. In this context, the term ‘asymmetric warfare’ is used
to describe inequalities and imbalances between belligerents involved in modern
armed conflicts that can reach across the entire spectrum of warfare.30 Most often,
reference is made to a disparate distribution of military power and technological
capacity.31 The power imbalances between the parties involved may be so pro-
nounced that from the outset the inferior party is bereft of any realistic prospect of
winning the conflict militarily. Military victory in the classical sense may not even
be the objective of the parties involved.32
The situation in Afghanistan is a conspicuous example, showing that there
is an evident chain of cause and effect between such power imbalances and what
is called guerrilla warfare.33 The military strength of the multinational forces in
Afghanistan induces the armed opposition to adopt so-called guerrilla tactics so as
28 See Claus Kress and Georg Nolte, ‘Im ungleichen Krieg’, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, available
at: http://www.faz.net/s/RubD5CB2DA481C04D05AA471FA88471AEF0/Doc~E0AAA1FCF923947BEB8
C20C7D45EFA2DC~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html (last visited 22 March 2011); Andreas Paulus and
Mindia Vashakmadze, ‘Asymmetrical war and the notion of armed conflict: a tentative conceptualiza-
tion’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 91, No. 873, 2009, p. 108. Generally, see Herfried
Mu¨nkler, ‘The wars of the 21st century’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 85, No. 849, 2003,
p. 7.
29 Stephen J. Blank, Rethinking Asymmetric Threats, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institutes,
September 2003, available at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=
103 (last visited 22 March 2011).
30 See Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Asymmetrical warfare and international humanitarian law’, in Wolff Heintschel
von Heinegg and Volker Epping (eds), International Humanitarian Law Facing New Challenges, Springer
Science and Business Media, Berlin and Heidelberg, 2007, pp. 11–48.
31 Robin Geiß, ‘Asymmetric conflict structures’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88, No. 864,
2006, pp. 757–777; Toni Pfanner, ‘Asymmetrical warfare from the perspective of humanitarian law and
humanitarian action’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87, No. 857, 2005, pp. 149–174.
32 William C. Martel, Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2007.
33 See, for instance, D. Kilcullen, above note 23, p. 39 onwards. Traditionally, especially in military theory,
asymmetric warfare has often been equated with guerrilla and partisan warfare. See Stephen Metz and
Douglas V. Johnson II, Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic
Concepts, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, January 2001, available at: http://
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/asymetry.pdf (last visited 3 January 2011).
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to evade direct military confrontation with a superior enemy and to level out their
inferiority. Some authors also suggest that the armed opposition in Afghanistan
primarily adopts an exhaustion strategy to gain control over the Pashtun regions,
instead of seeking a direct overthrow of the Afghan government.34 This simple logic
is not new; it has a long history in warfare.35 In the twentieth century, the wars of
national liberation and the vast majority of non-international armed conflicts were
all inherently asymmetric in this sense.
Notwithstanding their limited military means, the armed opposition
has shown itself to have the capacity to obstruct the strategic aims of its superior
adversaries in the furtherance of its own.36 The duration of the non-international
armed conflict in Afghanistan is testament to this reality. To date the conflict
has lasted almost ten years.37 The conflict in Afghanistan is highly dynamic. It tends
to evade clear-cut spatial and temporal demarcations. The level of violence is
fluctuating; hostilities erupt at any time and potentially anywhere. Thus battle
space is everywhere and traditional conceptions of a distinct ‘battlefield’ often seem
rather obsolete in this constellation.38 The Taliban in Afghanistan appears to consist
of a core of guerrilla fighters that move from one valley to another (especially when
their security is threatened), mounting ambushes, placing mines or improvised
explosive devices (IEDs – either person- or vehicle-activated, or remote-controlled),
using snipers, and even committing suicide attacks.39 These moving fighters
are often supported by local ‘part-time’ guerrillas and village cells (acting as a
co-ordinating and intelligence mechanism).40
34 See, e.g., D. Kilcullen, above note 23, pp. 50 and 52.
35 Andrew J. R. Mack, ‘Why big nations lose small wars: the politics of asymmetric conflict’, in World
Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1975, pp. 175–200.
36 Ivan Arreguı´n-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 2005.
37 ‘Is the Afghan War really the longest in U.S. history?’, in The Week, 10 June 2010, available at: http://
theweek.com/article/index/203842/is-the-afghan-war-really-the-longest-in-us-history (last visited
22 March 2011).
38 H. Mu¨nkler, above note 28, pp. 7–22; Herfried Mu¨nkler, Der Wandel des Krieges: Von der Symmetrie zur
Asymmetrie, 2nd edn, Velbru¨ck Wissenschaft, Weilerswist, 2006.
39 D. Kilcullen, above note 23, p. 55. Note that the armed opposition uses the expression ‘martyrdom
attacks’. See the unofficial ICRC translation in this issue (pp. 000–000) of, ‘The Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan: the laiha [code of conduct] for mujahids’, version of 29 May 2010, Art. 57. For examples of
recent suicide and other attacks see, inter alia, Heidi Vogt and Mirwais Khan, ‘Afghanistan suicide
bomber kills 6 NATO troops’, in The Huffington Post, 12 December 2010, available at: http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/12/afghanistan-suicide-bomber_n_795588.html (last visited 22 March
2011); Alissa J. Rubin, ‘31 killed in suicide attack on Afghan census office’ in The New York Times,
21 February 2011, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/world/asia/22afghanistan.html
(last visited 22 March 2011); and ‘Taliban attack Afghanistan Nato bases’, in RFI, 28 August 2010,
available at: http://www.english.rfi.fr/asia-pacific/20100828-taliban-attack-afghanistan-nato-bases (last
visited 22 March 2011). According to a report by the UN Secretary-General, there were about three
suicide attacks per week in 2010, mainly targeting international military forces. See Report of the
Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,
10 December 2010, UN Doc. S/2010/630, para. 15.
40 D. Kilcullen, above note 23, pp. 83–86.
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Asymmetric conflict structures raise an array of different (legal) prob-
lems.41 As far as the actual conduct of hostilities is concerned, discussions centre
on the impact of increasingly blurred lines of distinction on the application and
adequacy of the respective humanitarian rules. The constant evasion of direct
military confrontation, the deliberate shifting of hostilities from one location to
another, the adoption of population-centric approaches – all strategies frequently
bringing hostilities into the proximity of urban and civilian surroundings – all
aggravate the distinction between those who fight and protected civilians. In
practice, determining who or what may be attacked is increasingly difficult. As a
result, the risks for the civilian population are increased. At the same time, soldiers
operating on the ground also face greater security challenges as they cannot always
discern the difference between those who are participating in hostilities and those
who are not. This deplorable trend is well known.42 Time and again international
fora have expressed concern that civilians continue to bear the brunt of modern
armed conflicts.43 Less attention, however, has been devoted to the various ‘follow-
up’ questions that blurred lines of distinction raise when it comes to the identifi-
cation of legitimate military objectives, the application of the proportionality
principle, and the precautionary measures prescribed by virtue of Article 57 of
Additional Protocol I and customary law. Asymmetric conflicts, it seems, bring to
the fore a number of long-standing questions and ambiguities pertaining to the
humanitarian rules regarding the conduct of hostilities. This article analyses these
questions against the backdrop of the prolonged conflict in Afghanistan, mainly by
using the challenges faced by the international military forces as a case study.
The conduct of hostilities in asymmetric conflicts
The evasion of direct confrontation and the preservation of one’s own forces be-
come compelling priorities, especially for a militarily inferior belligerent. This may
particularly challenge the fundamental principle of distinction. Direct attacks may
easily be evaded by assuming civilian guise. Feigning protected status, mingling
with the civilian population, and launching attacks from objects that enjoy special
protection are all most deplorable but seemingly inevitable consequences of
this logic. Protection of military objectives that cannot so readily be concealed
may be sought by the use of human shields, thereby manipulating the enemy’s
41 The notion and definition of armed conflict under international humanitarian law has consequentially
received considerable attention in the recent literature. See A. Paulus and M. Vashakmadze, above note
28, pp. 95–125.
42 International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, document pre-
pared by the International Committee of the Red Cross for the 30th International Conference of the Red
Cross and Red Crescent, 30IC/07/8.4, October 2007, available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/
other/ihl-challenges-30th-international-conference-eng.pdf (last visited 22 March 2011).
43 See ibid.; UN Security Council, ‘Despite progress, civilians continue to bear brunt of conflict, says
Under-Secretary-General in briefing to Security Council’, press release of 26 June 2009, SC/9692, avail-
able at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9692.doc.htm (last visited 22 March 2011).
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proportionality assessment, in addition to violating the precautionary principle
laid out in Article 58 of Additional Protocol I and part of customary IHL applicable
in both international and non-international armed conflict.44
Reciprocity and other incentives for compliance
Repeated violations of humanitarian rules by one side are likely to influence
the other side’s behaviour also. The theoretical worst-case scenario is a dynamic
of negative reciprocity, that is, a spiral-down effect that ultimately culminates
in mutual disregard for the rules of IHL. If one belligerent constantly violates
humanitarian law and if such behaviour yields a tangible military advantage, the
other side may eventually also be inclined to disregard these rules in order to
enlarge its room for manoeuvre and thereby supposedly the effectiveness of its
counter-strategies.
The vicious circle of forthright reciprocal disregard of humanitarian rules,
however, has remained largely theoretical.45 Experience, especially in Afghanistan,
has shown that strict adherence to fundamental humanitarian precepts is con-
ducive to the achievement of long-term strategic objectives. Conversely, repeated
violations of humanitarian law, even if they seem to promise short-term military
gains, in the long run may undermine the credibility and reputation of a party to
the conflict, with potentially detrimental consequences for its ability to pursue
diplomatic, humanitarian, developmental, and other strategies that may be vital for
achieving long-term strategic goals.46 Even the short-term military advantages that
may be hoped to be gained by violating humanitarian rules are often negligible.
Superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering are just that: superfluous and
unnecessary. They hardly further the (military) objectives pursued.47 Thus far, the
central lesson in Afghanistan has been that the conflict will not be won solely
by military force or even primarily by that strategic instrument. Rather, winning
the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Afghan population has become the overall strategic
priority. Thus, since 2009, ISAF has operated on the premise that civilian casualties
and damages are to be minimized as much as possible.48 This doctrine appears
to have led to rules of engagement that partially exceed, to some extent, the
44 See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law,
Volume I: Rules, ICRC and Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, Rule 15, p. 51.
45 The ICTY has aptly noted that: ‘After the First World War, the application of the laws of war moved
away from a reliance on reciprocity between belligerents, with the consequence that, in general, rules
came to be increasingly applied by each belligerent despite their possible disregard by the enemy. The
underpinning of this shift was that it became clear to States that norms of international humanitarian
law were not intended to protect State interests; they were primarily designed to benefit individuals qua
human beings’. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, 14 January 2000,
para. 518.
46 Robert D. Sloane, ‘Prologue to a voluntarist war convention’, in Michigan Law Review, Vol. 106,
December 2007, p. 481.
47 Ibid.
48 Gregor Peter Schmitz and Gabor Steingart, ‘Genera¨le gegen Obama’, in Der Spiegel, 26 September 2009,
pp. 107–109.
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limitations imposed by IHL.49 The multinational forces thus frequently act
within a framework that puts stricter limitations on them and that seems necessary
in a context where casualties and destructions, even when within the limits of
IHL, could endanger the primary strategic goals.50 It therefore seems safe to con-
clude that, in Afghanistan, frequent disregard of humanitarian rules has not led to
a forthright race to the bottom in terms of compliance with humanitarian
rules. The predominant realization is rather that compliance with IHL continues
to serve vital (state) interests even in the absence of traditional conceptions of
reciprocity.51
The principle of distinction
Other strategies often adopted in asymmetric war situations may result in far more
diversified and subtle challenges to IHL than an outright disregard of that law in
direct response to preceding violations. These asymmetric situations may lead to
blurring the distinction between civilians and fighters and between civilian objects
and military objectives. In the context of Afghanistan this is exemplified by the
following two examples: first, the 2010 Code of Conduct for the Mujahideen re-
commends, inter alia, that the ‘Mujahids should adapt their physical appearance
such as hairstyle, clothes, and shoes in the frame of Sharia and according to the
common people of the area. On one hand, the Mujahids and local people will
benefit from this in terms of security, and on another hand, will allow Mujahids
to move easily in different directions.’52 Second, in the pursuit of ‘winning hearts
and minds’ and of a population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy,53
proximity to the local population is sought, use of provincial reconstruction
teams (PRTs) – co-locating civilian and military components – for relief activities
is made,54 or soldiers dress in civilian clothing.55 While no IHL rule relative to non-
international armed conflict explicitly prohibits such practices per se, this raises
49 For unclassified excerpts of a new Tactical Directive of 1 August 2010 (replacing the 1 July 2009 version),
see ISAF, above note 6. It is from these excerpts that one can draw some conclusions as to the rules of
engagement that were in force.
50 Ibid.
51 See also R. D. Sloane, above note 46, p. 481.
52 See ‘The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: the laiha [code of conduct] for mujahids’, above note 39,
Art. 81.
53 See US Department of the Army, FM 3-24.2: tactics in counterinsurgency, Washington, DC, 21 April 2009,
in particular on clear-hold-build operations, para. 3-106 et seq.
54 See, e.g., Save the Children, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian: Military Relations in
Afghanistan, London, 2004. In addition, for at least the period between 11 September 2001 and 1 May
2003, US and/or Coalition forces sometimes wore ‘indigenous clothing to blend in with the forces that
they were supporting’ or ‘civilian clothes while engaged in humanitarian relief efforts’. Center for Law
and Military Operations, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, Legal Lessons Learned
from Afghanistan and Iraq, Volume I: Major Combat Operations (11 September 2001–1 May 2003), United
States Army, 2004, pp. 64–69.
55 See, e.g. ISAFMEDIA, ‘Meet a Marine Sergeant who blends in with the Afghan people to do his job’,
02 May 2011, available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VoTH5tfTHIQ&feature=youtube_gdata
(last visited 5 May 2011).
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great concern with regard to the respect of the principle of distinction. The sheer
inconceivability of an often unfathomable and indistinguishable enemy has
sparked debate about where to draw the line between protected and unprotected
persons, and civilian and military objects, and whether this binary categorization
inherent in the principle of distinction is still adequate on the modern battlefield
and in highly dynamic combat situations.
Distinguishing persons who are protected against direct attack from
persons who may be attacked
Blurred lines of distinction have occasionally led some authors to argue in
favour of rather lenient interpretations of those legal criteria that are determinative
for a loss of protection from direct attack. Put simply, in response to an increas-
ingly difficult distinction between fighters and protected persons in practice,
proponents of this view suggest a widening of the legal category of persons who
may be legitimately attacked. Generally speaking, this line of argument is often
based on the premise that the modern battlefield has become ever more dangerous
for the soldiers operating therein and that therefore their margin of discretion
regarding the use of lethal force should be enlarged. Contemporary debate
surrounding the interpretation of the notion of ‘direct participation in
hostilities’ – an activity that temporarily deprives civilians of their protection
from direct attack – particularly the endorsement of rather generous interpreta-
tions of this notion and its temporal scope, are reflective of this tendency.56 For
example, the assumption that so-called voluntary ‘human shields’ are per se directly
participating in hostilities, thereby losing their protection from direct attack as well
as the suggestion that in case of doubt there should be a presumption that ‘ques-
tionable’ activity amounts to a ‘direct participation in hostilities’, are symptomatic
of this trend.57
In the same vein, there have been proposals to define membership in
organized armed groups rather broadly.58 Members of organized armed groups
cease to be civilians and therefore lose protection against direct attack for as long
as their membership lasts.59 They no longer benefit from the so-called ‘revolving
56 For an in-depth discussion, see the various contributions in the New York University Journal of
International Law and Politics, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2010, available at: http://www.law.nyu.edu/journals/jilp/
issues/jilpvolume42/index.htm (last visited 22 March 2011).
57 M. N. Schmitt, above note 4, p. 737 and n. 123 citing Michael N. Schmitt, ‘“Direct participation in
hostilities” and 21st century armed conflict’, in Horst Fischer et al. (eds), Crisis Management and
Humanitarian Protection: Festschrift fu¨r Dieter Fleck, Berlin, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2004, p. 509.
The author argues that ‘[g]ray areas should be interpreted liberally, i.e., in favour of finding direct
participation’.
58 K. Watkin, above note 4, p. 691.
59 In non-international armed conflicts, the membership approach is not uncontested: see e.g. Noam
Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-state Actors, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010,
pp. 148–155. In its study on direct participation, the ICRC adopted a membership approach based on
continuous combat function. See ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, Geneva, May 2009, pp. 31–36.
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door’ of civilian protection, meaning that – unlike civilians – they do not auto-
matically regain their protection from direct attack the moment they stop directly
participating in hostilities. Rather, as fighters, they may be directly attacked at
any time according to the same principles as members of the armed forces, that is
to say, independently from any actual direct participation in hostilities at the time
of the attack. However, identification of members of an organized armed group
can be extremely difficult. The situation in Afghanistan clearly demonstrates the
difficulties in distinguishing between a peaceful civilian and an armed opposition
fighter or a civilian directly participating in hostilities.60 The carrying of weapons
alone can certainly not be taken as a sign of direct participation in hostilities and
even less as a sign of membership in an organized armed group because Afghan
civilians traditionally have weapons in their homes to protect themselves and their
families.61 Moreover, reports suggests that intelligence gathering is rendered more
complicated because Afghan informants occasionally dupe the international mili-
tary forces into killing personal rivals rather than high-ranking members of the
armed opposition.62 Evidently, if membership in an organized armed group was to
be determined merely on the basis of a person’s support for or sympathy with
such a group – for instance, logistical support not related to military operations,
out of tribal solidarity – the category of unprotected persons (‘fighters’) would be
enlarged considerably. What is more, any such determination would probably be
prone to arbitrariness in the absence of objectively ascertainable criteria for a per-
son’s affiliation with an armed group.63
A diametrically opposed tendency however, rejects any attempts to further
broaden the categories of those who may legitimately be attacked.64 Proponents of
this trend, in view of the diffuse structures of asymmetric (non-international)
60 Note that civilians also include members of the Taliban without continuous combat function and who
are not directly participating in hostilities. At least in the period between 11 September 2001 and 1 May
2003, the Operation Enduring Freedom rules of engagement did not declare any forces hostile. Instead,
they relied upon the notion of ‘likely and identifiable threat (LIT)’ and positive identification (PID)
thereof, which caused confusion among the troops. The forces were trained for the usual three-pronged
approach, including declaration of hostile forces (targetable at any time), addressing direct participation
in hostilities, and, for situations not connected to hostilities, incorporating the concept of self-defence.
See Center for Law and Military Operations, above note 54, pp. 96–103; Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Targeting
and international humanitarian law in Afghanistan’, in M. N. Schmitt, above note 5, p. 314.
61 It is estimated that about a million guns are held by Afghan civilians, which equates to about 4.4 firearms
per 100 people. See data compiled by GunPolicy.org, available at: http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/
region/afghanistan (last visited 22 March 2011).
62 See, e.g., Allan Hall, ‘US troops “tricked into killing Afghan drug clan’s rival”’, in The Telegraph,
30 March 2009, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/5079429/US-
troops-tricked-into-killing-Afghan-drug-clans-rival.html (last visited 22 March 2011); Kim Sengupta,
‘Taliban factions may be using British forces to assassinate rival commanders’, in The Independent,
25 July 2008, available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/taliban-factions-may-be-
using-british-forces-to-assassinate-rival-commanders-876801.html (last visited 22 March 2011).
63 For an in-depth overview of the discussion, see Nils Melzer, ‘Keeping the balance between military
necessity and humanity: a response to four critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion
of Direct Participation in Hostilities’, in New York University Journal of International Law and Politics,
Vol. 42, No. 3, 2010, p. 831.
64 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston,
Addendum: study on targeted killings, UN Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add. 6, 28 May 2010, para. 65. See also
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conflicts tend to perceive the binary code of IHL – that is, the categorical distinc-
tion between fighters on the one hand and protected civilians on the other – as
overly rigid and inflexible.65 Some have even claimed that IHL’s status categories
have outlived their utility altogether. For example, it has been suggested that one
should refer to human rights law, disregarding the principle of distinction, as the
applicable law in times of non-international armed conflict also.66 In particular,
the Isayeva judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) of 2005
sparked debate as to whether, especially in non-international armed conflicts, a
higher but still realistic degree of protection could not possibly be achieved
through the (exclusive or preferential) application of human rights law.67
Leaving aside the question of whether international human rights law is
binding on armed groups as well as the problem of the extraterritorial application
of human rights law that arises whenever third states intervene in a non-
international armed conflict such as that in Afghanistan (note that it is undisputed
that IHL is binding on armed groups and that it applies extraterritorially in case of
an international or an internationalized non-international armed conflict), as far as
the conduct of hostilities is concerned predominant recourse to human rights law
rather than IHL would mark a paradigm shift that, at least for the time being, finds
little support in state practice. Unlike IHL, human rights law would allow the use of
potentially lethal force only in response to an imminent and sufficiently grave
threat. In particular, human rights law requires the taking into consideration of the
concrete circumstances of a given situation, irrespective of any binary distinction
between targetable combatants or fighters and protected civilians.68 The force em-
ployed must be proportionate in relation to the acute threat posed.69 This standard
is more protective. Most importantly, it is threat-proportionate and case-specific.
Derek Jinks, ‘Protective parity and the laws of war’, in Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 79, 2004, pp. 1524–
1528.
65 Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, ‘War everywhere: rights, national security law, and the law of armed conflict in
the age of terror’, in University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 153, 2004, pp. 675 and 757: ‘It would be
far better to make combatant status a purely functional question, one that hinges not on technicalities,
but on the degree to which a person is directly, actively, and primarily involved in knowingly or inten-
tionally planning or carrying out acts of violence’; Larry May, ‘Killing naked soldiers: distinguishing
between combatants and noncombatants’, in Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2005, p. 39.
66 See William Abresch, ‘A human rights law of internal armed conflict: the European Court of Human
Rights in Chechnya’, in The European Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2005, pp. 758–760 and
767.
67 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia, ECtHR, App.
Nos. 57947–49/00 (24 Feb. 2005); Isayeva v. Russia, ECtHR, App. No. 57950/00 (24 Feb. 2005).
68 In its country report on Colombia (1999), the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR)
emphasized that, under Article 4 ACHR, the use of lethal force in law enforcement operations could not
lawfully be based on mere suspicion or on collective criteria, such as membership in a group. According
to the report: ‘the police are never justified in depriving an individual of his life based on the fact that he
belongs to a “marginal group” or has been suspected of involvement in criminal activity. Nor may the
police automatically use lethal force to impede a crime or to act in self-defence. The use of lethal force in
such cases would only be permissible if it were proportionate and necessary’; IACHR, Report Colombia
1999, Chapter IV, para. 213.
69 Moreover, the justification of so-called collateral damage, while it is not illegal per se under international
human rights law, would be far more difficult than it is under IHL.
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In practice, however, it is still widely perceived as battlefield-inadequate, risky
to implement, and therefore unrealistic. Consequently, it is submitted that
in Afghanistan the principle of distinction, in spite of its inherent deficiencies in
asymmetric conflict situations, has not been put into question as a fundamental
legal precept of the humanitarian legal order, even though some authors have
proposed rather lenient interpretations. IHL’s categories of those who may legiti-
mately be attacked thus continue to remain central to states operating in modern
asymmetric armed conflicts such as Afghanistan.
The two strains of argument are reflective of the diametrically opposed
impulses on which IHL is based: military necessity and humanity. The former
line of reasoning, which argues in favour not only of the maintenance of IHL’s
categories based on the binary distinction but at least partially also of their exten-
sion, seems to be predominantly concerned with the minimization of risks for
operating soldiers – at times apparently without giving due regard to the protec-
tion of civilians. Conversely, the latter opinion, while rightly aiming to enhance
the protection of the civilian population – as mentioned before, civilians continue
to bear the brunt in modern armed conflicts – at times seems to neglect the
realities in which soldiers operate. Of course, a middle way might allow us to strike
a more subtle balance between the impulses of military necessity and humanity
without according categorical predominance to one or the other. Theoretically,
such a middle way could be sought by increasing the flexibility of humanitarian
legal standards towards greater protectiveness, or by increasing the flexibility of
human rights standards towards greater permissiveness, which is what the ECtHR
seemed to be doing in Isayeva, or by combining elements of both legal regimes.70
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s Interpretive
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities also pursues a middle
way, based on the interpretation of the law as it currently stands. On the one hand,
the Interpretive Guidance reconfirms the application of the principle of distinction
in modern armed conflicts and clarifies its application. Especially with regard to
non-international armed conflicts, the group of persons (‘fighters’) who are not
civilian and who may lawfully be attacked is defined on a functional basis,
by reference to their ‘continuous combat function’.71 On the other hand, the
Interpretive Guidance reiterates an important constraint in relation to the use of
force against persons who are not protected against direct attack. The kind and
degree of force that is permissible against such persons must not exceed what is
actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing
circumstances.72 Concern has been expressed that this standard imposes an overly
restrictive ‘law enforcement paradigm’ that aims to subject wartime military
operations ‘to an unrealistic use-of-force continuum beginning with the least-
injurious action before resorting to “grave injury” in attack of an enemy combatant
70 See also Francisco Forrest Martin, ‘Using international human rights law for establishing a unified use of
force rule in the law of armed conflict’, in Saskatchewan Law Review, Vol. 64, 2001, pp. 347–396.
71 ICRC, above note 59, pp. 27–36.
72 Ibid., pp. 77–82.
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or a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities’.73 The obligation to employ the
least harmful among equally effective means or methods, however, does not
amount to an extension of a ‘law enforcement paradigm’ or, in other words,
the application of the human rights principle of proportionality vis-a`-vis fighters
in an armed conflict. The principle of distinction already entails the prescription
that, during an armed conflict, the relative ‘value’ inherent in the rendering
hors de combat of enemy combatants/fighters or civilians directly participating in
hostilities outweighs the right to life, physical integrity, and liberty of these
persons. This alleviates individual soldiers of intricate value-balancing judgements
in the heat of combat. The necessity-restraint, by contrast – without interfering
with this value judgement – merely implies that there is no categorical relaxation of
the purely factual and in any case situational assessment whether less harmful
measures of equal effectiveness are available in a given situation.74 If an enemy
can already be rendered hors de combat by way of capture he must not be killed.
Of course, in the frontline of combat capture will almost always be impossible
without taking a considerable risk for one’s own troops, whereas in other
situations – for example, in the context of house searches75 or road blocks – this
risk is often likely to be mitigated to a level where capture instead of killing
becomes obligatory. The Interpretive Guidance’s prescription that force ‘must not
exceed what is actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose in the
prevailing circumstances’ is flexible enough to accommodate these different
scenarios.76
Distinguishing military objects from civilian objects: The problem of
‘dual use’
Challenges regarding the application of the principle of distinction exist not
only with regard to persons but also in relation to objects. Of course, debate
about the definition and identification of military objectives is not new. It existed
long before the term asymmetric warfare was coined and popularized. Yet the
shift of hostilities into the proximity of urban population centres and increasing
possibilities of using civilian objects to make an effective contribution to military
action are pushing this particular problematic more and more to the fore.
Discussions about which objects constitute a legitimate military objective,
particularly in relation to so-called ‘dual-use’ and war-sustaining objects, are
73 W. Hays Parks, ‘Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” study: no mandate, no ex-
pertise, and legally incorrect’, in New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 42,
No. 3, 2010, p. 815.
74 See US Department of the Air Force, Air Force Pamphlet (AFP 110-31), International Law: The Conduct
of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, Judge Advocate General Activities, 19 November 1976, para. 1-
3(1), pp. 1–5 recalling that: ‘Armed conflict must be carried on … within the limits of the prohibitions of
international law, including the restraints inherent in the principle of necessity’.
75 For statistics of civilian casualties see United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA),
Annual Report 2010: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Kabul, March 2011, p. 29.
76 ICRC, above note 59, p. 77.
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ongoing.77 Generally speaking, it is not disputed that power grids, industrial
and communication facilities, computer and cell-phone networks, transportation
systems, and other infrastructure including airports and railways – all of which
primarily fulfil civilian functions – can become lawful military targets if they meet
the criteria laid out in Article 52 paragraph 2 of Additional Protocol I, also re-
flecting customary IHL applicable in non-international armed conflicts.78 In fact,
each and every civilian object could theoretically become a military objective,
provided that it cumulatively fulfils the respective criteria. For instance, even re-
ligious sites, schools, or medical units may temporarily become military objectives
if 1) they make an effective contribution to military action by being used as a firing
position, to detonate improvised explosive devices, or to take cover; and 2) their
total or partial destruction offers a definite military advantage. ‘Dual-use’ is
the colloquial, non-legal denomination given to those civilian objects that serve
both military and civilian purposes. Thus, with regard to these so-called ‘dual-use’
objects, the problem is not whether such objects can theoretically become military
objectives but under what circumstances (and for how long) an attacker may
conclude that they are legitimate military objectives.
Broadly speaking, the discussion focuses on whether only actual or
also potential military benefit may qualify an object as a legitimate military ob-
jective.79 Evidently, if a so-called ‘dual-use object’ is visibly being used to make
an effective contribution to military action, then its legal classification will raise
no particular problems. However, if it is not being so used, the object’s status
determination will turn on its nature, purpose, or location. This is problematic
because the distinction between the two criteria of nature and purpose in
particular remains somewhat ambiguous. The criterion of purpose is problematic
because of the difficulty in determining at what point it becomes sufficiently
clear or sufficiently reasonable to assume that an object’s purpose is to contribute
effectively to military action. It is ambiguous because it is not entirely clear
whether the criterion aims to encapsulate an object’s inherent purpose – which
would seem to denote the object’s design or an intrinsic characteristic and there-
fore render redundant the distinction between ‘nature’ and ‘purpose’ in
Article 52 paragraph 2 of Additional Protocol I – or the purpose that a person
has (individually) accorded to the object. The ICRC Commentary speaks of
the ‘intended future use’ of an object, thereby apparently invoking the latter
77 W. Hays Parks, ‘Asymmetries and the identification of legitimate military objectives’, in W. Heintschel
von Heinegg and V. Epping, above note 30, pp. 65–116.
78 Although there is discussion about the interpretation of Article 52 of Additional Protocol I, the wording
itself is undisputed and it is not contested that the definition has customary law status: see J.-M.
Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 44, Rule 8.
79 Franc¸oise J. Hampson, ‘Proportionality and necessity in the Gulf conflict’, in Proceedings of the Annual
Meeting (American Society of International Law), Vol. 86, 1992, pp. 45 and 49; Yoram Dinstein, The
Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2004, p. 93; Michael Bothe, ‘The protection of the civilian population and NATO bombing
on Yugoslavia: comments on a report to the prosecutor of the ICTY’, in European Journal of International
Law, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2001, p. 534.
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interpretation.80 The criterion of nature is problematic because if applied to ‘dual-
use’ objects it would categorically and automatically render these objects legitimate
military targets irrespective of their actual use or purpose. Evidently, this would
render redundant the very idea of ‘dual use’ because these objects would categ-
orically amount to military objectives.81 Indeed, some authors argue that, for
example, bridges and railway tracks should be considered military objectives by
nature.82 In the same vein, the commentary to the recently released HPCR Air and
Missile Warfare Manual refers to an opinion expressed during the deliberations of
the Manual according to which military objectives are by nature to be divided into
two subsets consisting of ‘military objectives by nature at all times’ and objects that
become ‘military objectives by nature only in light of the circumstances ruling at
the time’.83 The ICRC strongly disagreed with this reading. It argued that the nature
criterion by definition refers to intrinsic attributes that are permanent. Therefore,
for the ICRC, there cannot be any subsets of temporary ‘military objectives by
nature’.84
The suggestion of such broadened interpretations of the definition of
military objects is again reflective of attempts to remedy practical difficulties in
identifying legitimate military targets through the expansion of the corresponding
legal concepts. Evidently, the ‘nature criterion’ is far more categorical and abstract,
whereas the criterion of an object’s actual use is more flexible and case-specific; that
is, it takes into consideration how a given object is actually being used at the time of
the attack. Conversely, the criterion of an object’s nature denotes the intrinsic
characteristics of the object. The object by way of its design must have an inherent
attribute that, eo ipso and irrespective of its actual use, makes an effective con-
tribution to military action.85 Thus, the conception of a category of ‘temporary
military objectives by nature’ or, in other words, ‘military objectives by nature
… in light of the circumstances ruling at the time’ would seem irreconcilable with
this common understanding of the ‘nature criterion’. Still, up until now, some
ambiguity has remained as to which intrinsic characteristics would count in this
regard. Traditionally, the category of objects that are considered to be military
objectives by nature has been interpreted rather narrowly and was understood to
encompass, for example, tanks, fixed military fortifications, weapon systems,
military aircraft, and stockrooms for the storage of weapons and munitions. If
bridges and railway tracks – that is, objects that commonly and overwhelmingly
serve civilian purposes – were to be considered as having intrinsic characteristics
80 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, and Bruno Zimmermann (eds), Commentary on the Additional
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Martinus Nijhoff, Geneva, 1987,
para. 2022.
81 Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR), Harvard University, Manual on
International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, Commentary, 2009, p. 109, available at: http://
www.ihlresearch.org/amw/manual/ (last visited 22 March 2011).
82 Y. Dinstein, above note 79, p. 93.
83 HPCR, above note 81, p. 109.
84 Ibid., p. 109, note 261.
85 Y. Dinstein, above note 79, p. 88.
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that render them permanent military objectives by nature irrespective of their
actual use, the remaining criteria of Article 52 paragraph 2 of Additional Protocol
I – namely location, purpose, and use – would be largely redundant. Put simply,
if a bridge was considered to have intrinsic military characteristics, basically
any object could be defined as a military object by nature. This was neither the
intention of the drafters of Article 52 paragraph 2 of Additional Protocol I nor
does it correspond to the traditional interpretation of the ‘nature’ criterion, and
ultimately such an interpretation would erode the principle of distinction. Instead,
so-called ‘dual-use’ objects in particular, because they are not by their nature
military, should only be attacked once they actually effectively contribute to the
party’s military action.86
It seems, therefore, that the law defining when objects constitute a
legitimate military objective has not been directly challenged or changed,87 perhaps
because the relevant rule acknowledges that every civilian object may temporarily
become a military objective under the circumstances described above.
The humanitarian proportionality principle88
In view of the blurred lines of distinction in asymmetric armed conflicts, carefully
assessing the proportionality of an attack is ever more important and often ever
more difficult. In practice, the application of the humanitarian proportionality
principle requires the following test. First, a factual assessment must be conducted
in order to determine whether a planned attack on a military objective ‘may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to
civilian objects’. Second, it has to be determined what ‘concrete and direct military
advantage’ may be anticipated from the attack. If civilian casualties and/or damages
may be expected, the military commander deciding upon the attack, in a third step,
must determine the value of the anticipated military advantage, on the one hand,
and the value attributed to the damage on the civilian side, on the other. In a final
step, a balancing decision is required, where a judgement is made about which
86 With regard to dual-use objects the ICTY Prosecutor’s report emphasized that the criteria laid out in
Article 52 of Additional Protocol I must be met in each individual case and that ‘[a] general label is
insufficient’. ‘Final report to the prosecutor by the committee established to review the NATO bombing
campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, 8 June 2000, pp. 47 and 55, available at: http://
www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/otp_report_nato_bombing_en.pdf (last visited 22 March 2011).
87 In the application of joint fires in Afghanistan, for instance, several factors need to be taken into account
before an attack is permitted. This includes, inter alia, an assessment as to whether or not the target
makes an effective contribution to the enemy military action and as to whether its destruction offers a
definite military advantage (i.e. whether it is a military objective). Guidance for the Application of Joint
Fires, Annex B to HQ ISAF SOP, Dated 06, extract presented at the Rules of Engagement Workshop,
International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Sanremo, 13–17 September 2010. According to Joint Pub
3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, 12 May 1998, p. I–1, joint fires are ‘fires produced during the
employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action toward a common objec-
tive’.
88 For the application of the proportionality principle in non-international armed conflicts, see J.-M.
Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 44, Rule 14, p. 48.
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value takes precedence over the other.89 Despite the fact that IHL pursues the
overall aim of limiting civilian casualties and damages as far as possible, it does
not prescribe any absolute limit in relation to ‘collateral damage’. Thus, a very
considerable military advantage could potentially justify significant civilian
damages and even casualties – that is, extensive as opposed to excessive ‘collateral
damage’.90
Factors to be considered within the proportionality assessment
The humanitarian proportionality principle’s deficiencies are well known. The
main difficulty lies in the balancing of such unequal factors as civilian life and
injury against an anticipated military advantage. Notwithstanding, there is still
widespread agreement that in times of armed conflict a better, equally realistic
alternative simply does not exist.91 While that may be true, it should also be clear
that the details of the proportionality principle and its application in practice could
still be worked out more concretely than they have been to date. In this regard, the
‘Final report to the prosecutor by the committee established to review the NATO
bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ raised an array
of instructive questions relevant for the application of the humanitarian pro-
portionality principle. The Report asked, inter alia: ‘a) What are the relative values
to be assigned to the military advantage gained and the injury to non-combatants
or the damage to civilian objects? b) What do you include or exclude in totaling
your sums? [and] c) What is the standard of measurement in time or space?’92 The
report was published on 13 June 2000 but even ten years later the questions it
raised with regard to the proportionality principle remain as pertinent as they were
at the time.
IHL’s answers to these questions are rather abstract. As noted above, the
military commander deciding upon the attack must determine the relative value
given to the military advantage against that attributed to the anticipated damage
on the civilian side. Normative guidance regarding the margin of discretion in
the identification of the military advantage and its relative value is rather frail.
The adjectives ‘concrete’ and ‘direct’ in Article 51 paragraph 5(b) of Additional
Protocol I limit the advantages to be considered to finite ones, in order to prevent
the inclusion of abstract considerations such as the global aim of winning the war,
which as the highest military aim would per se trump almost all civilian interests.
But there seems to be widespread agreement that the military advantage need not
necessarily or exclusively be derived from the destruction of the specific object of
89 Asbjørn Eide, ‘The laws of war and human rights: differences and convergences’, in Christophe Swinarski
(ed.), Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honor of Jean
Pictet, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1984, p. 681.
90 Note that the ICRC commentary rejects this argument because very high civilian losses and damages
would be contrary to the fundamental rules of the Protocol. See Y. Sandoz et al., above note 80, para.
1980.
91 Y. Dinstein, above note 79, p. 122.
92 ‘Final report to the prosecutor’, above note 86, para. 49.
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the attack and that the assessment of the military advantage may be conducted by
taking into consideration the larger operational picture.93 On the basis of Article 8
paragraph 2(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, some
authors argue in favour of the consideration of the overall military advantage
anticipated from an attack as a matter of general law.94 The overall military
advantage would encapsulate military advantages derived from temporally and
geographically distant occurrences. In this context it seems noteworthy that during
the Rome Conference the ICRC stated that the insertion of the word ‘overall’ to the
definition of the crime could not be interpreted as changing existing law.95
A corollary to the debate about the scope of the military advantage is
the question of how far indirect civilian damages resulting from an attack are to be
taken into consideration. The spectrum of opinion is wide. Moderate positions do
not exclude the consideration of indirect civilian damages but try to sketch out
where to draw the line between indirect damages that may be considered and those
that should not.96 The wording of Article 51 paragraph 5(b) and Article 57 para-
graph 2(b) of Additional Protocol I would seem to suggest that the concept of
anticipated civilian casualties and damages is to be interpreted at least as broadly as
the notion of the military advantage. Otherwise the proportionality assessment
would be distorted from the outset in favour of military considerations. Moreover,
these two articles explicitly require that the anticipated military advantage is
‘concrete’ and ‘direct’, whereas no such limiting qualifiers were added to the ex-
pected incidental civilian damages; the word ‘incidental’ is certainly broader than
the adjectives ‘concrete’ and ‘direct’. Similarly, it would seem that the conception
of what ‘may be expected’ (incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof) from an attack is broader than what is
actually ‘anticipated’ (military advantage). Thus, in line with the fundamental tenet
that the civilian population enjoys general protection arising not only from attacks
but from military operations in general, foreseeable long-term repercussions on the
civilian population are to be taken into account in the context of the proportion-
ality assessment.
In the context of the armed conflict in Afghanistan, the US in particular
has apparently developed an intricate set of rules for pre-planned (deliberate)
93 Almost all NATO member states ratifying Additional Protocol I (and also other states when signing or
ratifying the Protocol) made identical declarations according to which ‘military advantage’ is to be
understood to refer to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only
from isolated or particular parts of the attack.
94 Y. Dinstein, above note 79, p. 123; William J. Fenrick, ‘The rule of proportionality and Protocol I in
conventional warfare’, in Military Law Review, Vol. 98, 1982, pp. 111–112; Ian Henderson, The
Contemporary Law of Targeting: Military Objectives, Proportionality and Precautions in Attack under
Additional Protocol I, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2009, p. 200 (‘the assessment can include a military
advantage that will not crystallize until sometime in the future’).
95 ‘Document A/CONF.183/INF/10 – International Committee of the Red Cross: Statement of 8 July 1998
Relating to the Bureau Discussion Paper in Document A/CONF.183/C.1/L.53’, in United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome,
15 June–17 July 1998, Official Records, Vol. III: Reports and other documents, p. 225, point 2.
96 I. Henderson, above note 94, p. 208.
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targeting, taking into account counterinsurgency objectives.97 Prior to an engage-
ment, a target must be identified (positive identification, or PID)98 and authorized
for engagement in accordance with the rules of engagement in force.99 The so-called
CARVER (criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effects, and re-
cognizability) tool sets out factors assisting in evaluating and selecting targets. The
factors are given a numeric value, representing the desirability of attacking the
target, which then are placed in a decision matrix.100 Before the deliberate engage-
ment of a target may be authorized, a collateral damage estimate (CDE) must be
conducted.101 This consists of a sophisticated methodology including ‘computer-
assisted modeling, intelligence analysis, weaponeering and human vetting to assess
likely collateral damage and determine the level at which a preplanned strike
must be approved’.102 Further Details of CDE methodology applied in Afghanistan
remain classified. However, it appears that modern technologies make it possible
to calculate the likely impact of an airstrike on buildings and other objects in
the vicinity of the target. The effects can then be shown through an ellipse on a
surveillance image and colour codes indicate the degree of damage expected.103
The standard of a ‘reasonable military commander’
The value judgement inherent in the proportionality analysis is difficult to scruti-
nize. Controversy continues as to whether this judgement is to be evaluated on
the basis of a subjective or of an objective standard. The ICTY ‘Final report to
97 For a detailed description of targeting in counterinsurgency in general and in Afghanistan in particular,
see M. N. Schmitt, above note 60, pp. 309–326. See also a description of the Joint Targeting Cycle and
Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology (CDM) attached to United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, Nasser Al-Aulaqi v. Barack H. Obama, et al., Declaration of Jonathan Manes,
No. 10-cv–1469 (JDB), 8 October 2010.
98 Positive identification is ‘a reasonable certainty that the proposed target is a legitimate military target’.
Center for Law and Military Operations, above note 54, p. 96.
99 Ibid., p. 103. Note that, while the rules of engagement must remain within IHL limits, i.e. can only
permit the targeting of military objectives, they may impose greater targeting restrictions for political or
operational reasons.
100 The CARVER tool was initially developed as a target analysis methodology for US Special Operations
Forces. It is used to assess mission validity and requirements throughout the targeting and mission
planning cycle and assists in selecting the best targets. For a definition of the factors, see Joint Pub 3-05.5,
Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures, 1993, p. II-8 and glossary. See also US
Field Manual FM 34-36, Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations,
Department of the Army, 1991, Appendix D, superseded by FM 3-05.102, Army Special Operations Forces
Intelligence, Department of the Army, 2001, para. 2–68. An example of a modified CARVER tool was
presented at the Rules of Engagement Workshop, International Institute of Humanitarian Law,
Sanremo, 13–17 September 2010.
101 Extract of Joint Forces Command Brunssum OPLAN 30302, presented at the Rules of Engagement
Workshop, International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Sanremo, 13–17 September 2010. The formal
CDE methodology need not be conducted in self-defence situations. However, the principles of pro-
portionality and necessity still have to be observed in such situations. See Center for Law and Military
Operations, above note 54, p. 104.
102 M. N. Schmitt, above note 60, p. 311.
103 See, e.g., Public Prosecutor General of the Federal Court of Justice, Einstellungsvermerk, 3BJs 6/10-4,
Karlsruhe, 16 April 2010, p. 22, available at: http://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/docs/einstell
ungsvermerk20100416offen.pdf (last visited 22 March 2011).
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the prosecutor’ emphasized that the assignment of relative values under the pro-
portionality equation ‘may differ depending on the background and values of the
decision maker’, that consequently a ‘human rights lawyer and an experienced
combat commander’ or ‘military commanders with different doctrinal back-
grounds and differing degrees of combat experience’ were unlikely to ‘assign the
same relative values to military advantage’ and the anticipated damages.104 It is in
view of this value judgement and not – as one might suspect – in view of the fact
that in operational theatres of conflict the environment may not lend itself to
rigorous factual assessments that the report as well as the Trial Chamber in the
Kupresˇkic´ case arrived at the conclusion that grey zones exist between ‘indisputable
legality and unlawfulness in which one may not yet determine that a violation of
the principle of proportionality has indeed occurred’.105
In the realm of international criminal law, footnote 36 of the elements of
crime of Article 8 paragraph 2(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute explains that the ‘military
advantage’ refers to the advantage foreseeable by the perpetrator, and footnote 37
requires that the perpetrator personally makes the required value judgement.106 The
‘Final report to the prosecutor’ of the ICTY, however, rightly endorsed a more
objectified standard. According to the Report, the decisive yardstick for such far-
ranging decisions as the assignment of the relative value of a military advantage and
the relative value of the anticipated civilian losses is that of a ‘reasonable military
commander’.107 Indeed, operational requirements in an armed conflict neither de-
mand nor justify a purely subjective decision-making standard. Of course, IHL
must provide for fluctuating circumstances and the myriad uncertainties that are
prevalent in an armed conflict, and it must – in order to be realistic – leave a
margin of discretion to soldiers operating on the ground. However, the actual
104 ‘Final report to the prosecutor’, above note 86, para. 50.
105 Ibid., para. 52; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupresˇkic´ et al., IT-95-16-T, Judgment of 14 January 2000, para.
526.
106 Footnote 37 of the elements of crime of Article 8 para. 2(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute contains an
exception to the mental requirements laid out in paragraph 4 of the ‘General Introduction’, according to
which, with respect to mental elements associated with elements involving value judgment, such as those
using the terms ‘inhumane’ or ‘severe’, it is not necessary that the perpetrator personally completed a
particular value judgement, unless otherwise indicated. See Knut Do¨rmann, Elements of War Crimes
under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 161. Different views have been expressed on the interpretation of
footnote 37. However, on the whole a rather subjective standard seems to be endorsed in this regard.
There appears to be agreement between states that this footnote should not lead to the result of exon-
erating a reckless perpetrator who knows the anticipated military advantage and the expected incidental
damage or injury but gives no thought to evaluating the possible excessiveness of the incidental injury or
damages; ibid., p. 165.
107 ‘Final report to the prosecutor’, above note 86, para. 50, states: ‘Although there will be room for argu-
ment in close cases, there will be many cases where reasonable military commanders will agree that the
injury to noncombatants or the damage to civilian objects was clearly disproportionate to the military
advantage gained’. In the Kupresˇkic´ case, the ICTY relied on the Martens Clause as a minimum reference
and argued on this basis that the prescriptions – in this case the prescriptions of Articles 57 and 58 of
Additional Protocol I – must be interpreted so as to construe as narrowly as possible the discretionary
power to attack belligerents and, by the same token, so as to expand the protection accorded to civilians;
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupresˇkic´ et al., above note 105, para. 525.
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margin of discretion and the standard relevant for the evaluation of individual
decision-making are to be distinguished. An objectified decision-making
standard – the standard of the ‘reasonable military commander’ – does not curtail
a soldier’s margin of discretion in the assessment of situational realities but simply
forestalls arbitrariness in the exercise of this discretion.
Risk minimization for one’s own forces
In conflict scenarios such as Afghanistan, the question of risk minimization for
one’s own forces is particularly pertinent to all parties involved. Indistinguishable
enemies render ground operations particularly dangerous. Naturally, a party to an
armed conflict will be inclined to minimize risks for its own forces as much as
possible. Risk minimization for soldiers, however, may increase the risk of civilian
casualties. This is particularly evident if a choice has to be made, for example,
between the employment of aerial power or ground forces, or between low- and
high-altitude aerial operations. Again, ten years ago the Committee Established to
Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
raised the issue of whether risk minimization can be taken into consideration as a
relevant factor when conducting a proportionality assessment.
Generally speaking, the protection and preservation of one’s own forces is
a legitimate consideration under IHL. Anything else would contradict the realities
of armed conflict. It is for this reason that different modern military manuals
define military necessity as requiring measures to defeat the enemy with the ‘least
expenditure of time, means or personnel’ or a ‘minimum expenditure of life and
resources’.108 But this does not answer the question whether, and if so to what
extent, the contemporary humanitarian legal framework leaves room to take into
consideration the protection of one’s own forces in the context of a concrete pro-
portionality assessment conducted prior to a specific attack.
IHL bars any attempts to take into account general considerations that
could trump the protection of the civilian population or individual civilians per se.
Article 51 paragraph 5(b) of Additional Protocol I shows that a balancing decision
is required on a case-by-case basis and in view of each and every attack. Sweeping
assumptions that any particular consideration – such as the security of one’s own
forces – could per se override civilian interests are not allowed. In view of IHL’s
general tenet to protect and in any event to minimize civilian casualties and
damages, the protection of one’s own forces cannot be regarded or invoked as
categorically overriding the protection of the civilian population or the lives of
individual civilians. However, this does not exclude the consideration of risks as far
108 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2004, section 2.2; United States Department of the Navy, The Commander’s Handbook on the
Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12-1/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, July 2007, para. 5.3.1. It
has been pointed out that the criterion of minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources
should be understood to apply not only to the assailant but also to the party attacked; see Y. Sandoz, C.
Swinarski, and B. Zimmermann (eds), above note 80, para. 1397.
34
R. Geiß and M. Siegrist – Has the armed conflict in Afghanistan affected the rules on the conduct
of hostilities?
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383111000191
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 17:35:58, subject to the Cambridge Core
as the planning of a concrete attack and the determination of a concrete military
advantage is concerned. In this regard, two issues must be distinguished: the
security of one’s own forces in general and the security of the attacking forces
in particular. If ‘A’ is attacking the ground forces of ‘B’ and if ‘B’ therefore calls
in aerial support to stop the attack and to protect its ground forces, the preser-
vation of ‘B’s’ ground forces is a military advantage that may be taken into con-
sideration in addition to the military advantage derived from the destruction of
‘A’s’ troops. The reason is that both advantages (the destruction of ‘A’s’ troops and
the preservation of ‘B’s’ troops) will directly result from the attack; neither will
materialize until after the attack has been carried out.
The enhanced security of the ‘attacking forces’, however, would not,
strictly speaking, be a result of the attack. It materializes not from the actual attack
but rather from the strategic decision (prior to the attack) to attack in one way (e.g.
high-altitude) rather than in another way (e.g. ground forces). If in such a scenario
the security of the attacking forces could be taken into consideration within the
proportionality equation – quid non – the fact that a commander has chosen a very
secure and therefore ostensibly ‘militarily advantageous method’ (e.g. aerial bom-
bardment) would mean that, in view of the heightened military advantage of this
particular form of attack, higher numbers of civilian casualties could be justified.
Evidently, this is an extremely slippery slope. In the scenario provided, the con-
sideration of the security of the attacking forces would distort the proportionality
assessment in favour of military considerations and to the detriment of the civilian
population it intends to protect. This does not mean that military commanders
would be barred from taking into consideration the security of their attacking
forces when planning an attack. Clearly, they may. But, whatever the outcome of
their planning may be, each and every attack that they intend to carry out must
be in accordance with humanitarian law. If an aerial bombardment would cause
excessive civilian casualties it must not be carried out. In this case, a military
commander may either decide not to attack at all, to resort to alternative means
and methods of attack (for which he would again have to carry out a proportion-
ality assessment), or to wait for circumstances on the ground to change. However,
under no circumstances could a high-altitude aerial bombardment – in spite of an
initial, negative proportionality assessment – be justified on the basis of arguing
that it is ‘safer’ and therefore of a higher military advantage than hypothetical
alternative forms of attack such as a low-altitude sortie or an attack with ground
forces. It is widely accepted that hypothetical military advantages must not count
in the proportionality calculus.109
Precautions in attack
Modern armies have unprecedented surveillance possibilities. Surveillance drones,
for example, can monitor any given area without interruption over significant
109 Y. Dinstein, above note 79, p. 93.
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periods of time, and they can provide real-time visual footage to those who plan
and decide upon the attack.110 These technological possibilities notwithstanding,
blurred lines of distinction in asymmetric conflict situations often impede an ac-
curate analysis of the target area, as well as reliable predictions of potential civilian
damages. The detection and identification of legitimate targets, as well as the
maintenance of such identification in realistic battlefield conditions, has been de-
scribed as one of the most difficult problems facing modern armies involved in
combat.111 This section is limited to two specific precautions in attack, namely
target verification and effective warnings. The analysis focuses particularly on the
capabilities of the international military forces.
Target verification
What quantity and quality of information about a military objective is an attacker
required to obtain before executing an attack? Is it sufficient to rely exclusively
on aerial surveillance or is on-the-spot human intelligence required? IHL does
not, and cannot, provide a clear-cut, generic answer to these questions. According
to Article 57 paragraph 2(a)(i) of Additional Protocol I, those who plan or
decide upon an attack are required to do everything feasible to verify that the
objectives to be attacked are military objectives.112 It follows that the answers to
the questions raised above depend on what is ‘feasible’ under the given circum-
stances of a specific attack. For instance, as long as military personnel are not in
imminent danger, the July 2009 ISAF Tactical Directive seems to require a ‘48-hour
“pattern of life” analysis with on-the-ground or aerial surveillance, to ensure
that civilians are not in a housing compound before ordering an airstrike’.113
During the drafting stages of Additional Protocol I the phrase ‘everything feasible’
was discussed at length.114 The initial draft put forward at the 1971 Conference of
Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts had foreseen the word ‘ensure’,
but ultimately did not succeed.115 The word ‘feasible’ was preferred over the
term ‘reasonable’ and it was understood to denote ‘that which is practicable or
110 Jack M. Beard, ‘Law and war in the virtual era’, in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 103, No. 3,
2009, p. 433.
111 I. Henderson, above note 94, p. 164.
112 For the application of this rule in non-international armed conflicts, see J.-M. Henckaerts and
L. Doswald-Beck, above note 44, Rule 16.
113 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, ‘Petraeus review directive meant to limit Afghan civilian deaths’, in The
Washington Post, 9 July 2010. See also, ISAF, Tactical Directive, 6 July 2009, available at: http://
www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/Tactical_Directive_090706.pdf (last visited 22 March 2011).
A ‘pattern of life’ analysis including Predator coverage was also conducted in the targeting of a senior
HiG commander in November 2006. Case study presented at the Rules of Engagement Workshop,
International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Sanremo, 13–17 September 2010.
114 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, and B. Zimmermann (eds), above note 80, para. 2198.
115 ICRC, Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Volume III: Protection of the Civilian Population
Against Dangers of Hostilities, 1971, p. 136.
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practically possible’.116 To this some delegations added that, when assessing what
was practicable or practically possible, ‘all the circumstances at the time of the
attack, including those relevant to the success of military operations’ would have to
be taken into account.117 Understood in this way, the feasibility requirement would
seem to denote not only that which is objectively practicable or practically possible
but also what is militarily sound from the perspective of the military commander.
Such an extended reading of the feasibility requirement would add another rather
subjective element to the assessment. A comparison with Article 57 paragraph 2(c)
of Additional Protocol I, however, shows that, where such a far-reaching caveat was
intended, it is expressed in explicit terms. This paragraph requires effective advance
warnings ‘unless circumstances do not permit’. No such explicit caveat was in-
cluded within the obligation to verify the status of an anticipated target contained
in Article 57 paragraph 2(a)(i) of the Protocol. The ICRC Commentary therefore
rejects an interpretation of the feasibility criterion that would include ‘all circum-
stances relevant to the success of military operations’ as too broad and as a possible
avenue to opt out of the precautionary obligation prescribed by Article 57 para-
graph 2(a)(i) of the Protocol.118 This must be right. After all, target verification is a
fundamental prerequisite for any application of the principle of distinction.
Irrespective of this particular debate, the formulation ‘do everything
feasible to verify’ seems to imply that if everything practically possible has been
done, but doubt remains as to the status of the envisaged target, a military com-
mander, in spite of the remaining uncertainty, would be allowed to attack. The
ICRC Commentary rejects such a lenient reading of the obligation to verify an
object’s status prior to an attack. According to the Commentary, a commander
planning an attack must ‘in case of doubt, even if there is only a slight doubt … call
for additional information and if need be give orders for further reconnaissance’.119
This standard, which requires the elimination of doubt about an object’s status, has
been criticized as too high.120 However, allowing attacks in spite of remaining doubt
about an object’s status would significantly undermine the principle of distinction.
For as long as doubt remains, IHL stipulates certain presumptions in favour of a
protected status (Article 50 paragraph 1 and Article 52 paragraph 3 of Additional
116 ICRC, Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (1974–1977), Vol. 15, p. 285. A feasibility assessment is
necessarily contextual and what is feasible also hinges on the reconnaissance resources available to the
attacker. It is therefore generally accepted that, in practice, technologically advanced parties may be
bound to a higher standard than those parties who lack similarly advanced reconnaissance means. See
also Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices
(Protocol II), Geneva, 10 October 1980, Article 3(4). Accordingly, ‘[f]easible precautions are those
precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at
the time, including humanitarian and military considerations’.
117 See, e.g., the statements made by the UK, Turkey, Germany, Canada, and the US, ICRC, Conference of
Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable
in Armed Conflicts (1974–1977), Vol. 6, pp. 211, 214, 224, 226, and 241 respectively.
118 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, and B. Zimmermann (eds), above note 80, para. 2918.
119 Ibid., para. 2195. Moreover, the ICRC Commentary requires that the evaluation of the information
obtained must include a serious check of its accuracy.
120 I. Henderson, above note 94, p. 163.
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Protocol I).121 These presumptions would be rendered meaningless if attacks were
to be allowed in cases of doubt.
This is even more important because the ‘no doubt’ criteria in itself cannot
guarantee that only military objectives are targeted, as was demonstrated, for in-
stance, by the Kunduz airstrike of 4 September 2009 on two fuel tankers captured
by the armed opposition. The German Public Prosecutor General came to the
conclusion that the accused Colonel was convinced (in accordance with the
‘reasonable military commander’ standard) that no civilians were present in
the vicinity of the fuel tankers. He consulted multiple times, over several hours, the
available videos from ISAF aircraft and information given by an informant whose
credibility was not challenged. In addition, he ordered a PID by the aircraft crew
for weapons. Since he did not expect any civilians to be present at the time of
the airstrike (01:49 am), he declined a ‘show-of-force’ manoeuvre to disperse the
people on the ground, all supposedly armed opposition fighters.122 It eventually
turned out that a large proportion of the casualties were civilians.123
Of course, it is true – and perhaps in asymmetric conflicts even more so –
that targeting decisions often have to be made in the ‘fog of battle’ and that ‘clinical
accuracy’ may not always be possible.124 But the ‘fog of battle’ is risky not only for
soldiers operating therein but also for the civilians who are often trapped in it.
Nothing in the humanitarian legal framework indicates that factual uncertainties
would require a lowering of civilian protection as a matter of law. Thus, while the
‘fog of battle’ may not always allow ‘clinical accuracy’ in decision-making, it may
well be argued that it is precisely for the fog of battle, precisely because conflicts are
highly dynamic and circumstances change rapidly, that IHL requires target verifi-
cation and disallows attacks in case of doubt.
Effective warnings
According to Article 57 paragraph 2(c) of Additional Protocol I and customary
law, effective advance warning shall be given of ‘attacks which may affect the
121 The presumptions entailed in Article 51 para. 1 and Article 52 para. 3 of Additional Protocol I have
remained the subject of controversy, however. Particularly in the case of non-international armed con-
flicts, no clear rule regulates situations where the character of a person is in doubt. Nevertheless, it seems
appropriate to demand the same careful and balanced approach in deciding upon the status of people as
is required in international armed conflicts. See J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 44,
Rule 6, pp. 23–24.
122 Public Prosecutor General of the Federal Court of Justice, above note 103. Note that airstrikes seem to
have been limited to troops-in-contact (TIC) situations. The German commander eventually classified the
situation as an imminent threat, on the ground that he feared that the fuel tanks could be used against
the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kunduz or be prepared for later attacks. Ibid., p. 23.
123 See, e.g., ibid., p. 36 et seq.; Christoph Reuter, ‘Entscha¨digung fu¨r die Kundus-Opfer steht’, in Stern,
5 August 2010, available at: http://www.stern.de/politik/ausland/tanklaster-angriff-in-afghanistan-
entschaedigung-fuer-die-kundus-opfer-steht-1590279.html (last visited 22 March 2011); James Sturcke
and David Batty, ‘Nato air strike in Afghanistan kills scores’, in The Guardian, 4 September 2009.
124 Michael Bothe, Karl Josef Partsch, and Waldemar A. Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts:
Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Convention of 1949, Martinus Nijhoff,
The Hague, 1982, p. 279.
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civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit’.125 The obligation to warn,
in view of increasingly blurred lines of distinction, is constantly growing in
importance and humanitarian impact. Leaving aside the questions as to which
kinds of warning amount to an ‘effective’ advance warning and how the caveat
‘unless circumstances do not permit’ is to be interpreted, the obligation pre-
scribed by Article 57 paragraph 2(c) of Additional Protocol I stands and falls
with the determination whether an attack ‘may affect the civilian population’. In
the context of the Kunduz incident of 4 September 2009, the Office of the
German Federal Prosecutor did not consider the existence of an obligation to
warn, on the premise that the attack had not been expected to affect any civi-
lians.126 Consequentially, the Federal Prosecutor did not have to deal with any of
the questions laid out above, namely whether the circumstances would have
permitted a warning or not. In the same vein, the US Air Force Pamphlet states
that no warning is required if civilians are unlikely to be affected by the attack.127
The UK Military Manual, arguably somewhat more narrowly, considers that no
warning is required if no civilians are left in the area to be attacked.128 But in
view of the dynamics of modern asymmetric armed conflicts and in light of
increasingly blurred lines of distinction, could one ever realistically exclude the
possibility that an (aerial) attack ‘may affect the civilian population’? Especially
in the case of aerial attacks and bombardments, it seems that this could hardly
ever be ruled out with any degree of certainty. The Kunduz incident, viewed
from an ex post perspective, is testament to this reality. Certainly, the word ‘may’
in Article 57 paragraph 2(c) of the Protocol does not require any degree of
certainty as to whether an attack will indeed affect civilians; the mere possibility
suffices. Thus, the criterion of ‘attacks which may affect the civilian population’
should be interpreted broadly. Unless it can be ruled out that an attack will
affect the civilian population, the obligation to warn is triggered. This can hardly
be perceived as an overly onerous standard. After all, Article 57 paragraph 2(c)
of the Protocol still explicitly allows for the consideration of situational cir-
cumstances including military considerations.129 Thus, even on the basis of a
broadened understanding of when an attack ‘may affect the civilian population’,
this Article would not categorically require a warning prior to each and every
attack. Military commanders would still be granted a considerable margin of
discretion in determining whether the circumstances actually permit a warning
or not.
125 J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 44, Rule 20, p. 62, emphasis added.
126 See Statement of the Office of the Federal Prosecutor of 19 April 2010, para. 2, available at: http://
www.generalbundesanwalt.de/de/showpress.php?searchstring=Klein&newsid=360 (last visited 22 March
2011).
127 United States, Air Force Pamphlet (1976), para. 5–3(c)(2)(d).
128 United Kingdom, Military Manual (1958), para. 291.
129 The ICRC Commentary provides that giving a warning may be inconvenient when the element of sur-
prise in the attack is a condition of its success: see Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, and B. Zimmermann (eds),
above note 80, para. 2223.
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The different paradigms of law enforcement and the conduct of
hostilities: vehicle checkpoints in Afghanistan as a case in point
In contemporary armed conflicts (and Afghanistan is a particular case in point), it
often seems difficult to assess whether certain operations are governed by the
‘paradigm of law enforcement’ or ‘the paradigm of hostilities’.130 The distinction is
especially relevant because the constraint on the use of force may differ signifi-
cantly. Whereas the paradigm of hostilities is primarily governed by the specific
rules relative to the conduct of hostilities, the paradigm of law enforcement is
primarily governed by human rights standards, provided that the application of
human rights norms is established under the specific circumstances.131 In the con-
text of an armed conflict, IHL may prevail over or influence the interpretation of
these standards.132
One conspicuous example in the context of Afghanistan where the two
paradigms potentially overlap is provided by (vehicle) checkpoints. These are an
important security measure in Afghanistan: ISAF, OEF, and Afghan forces all use
them as a method to control people, to seize weapons and drugs, and to arrest
suspected members of the armed opposition.133 At the same time, checkpoints can
also be regarded as a means to impede enemy movement and they may become the
130 For this terminology and definition of these paradigms, see Nils Melzer, Targeted Killing in International
Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, in particular pp. 85–90 and 269–298 respectively.
131 Considerable debate exists regarding the extraterritorial application of human rights. See, inter alia, Jann
K. Kleffner, ‘Human rights and international humanitarian law: general issues’, in Terry D. Gill and
Dieter Fleck (eds), The Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 69 onwards; and N. Lubell, above note 59, pp. 193–235. For instance, according
to Article 1 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (ECHR), the rights and freedoms of the convention must be secured ‘to everyone within their
[the High Contracting Parties’] jurisdiction’. In its case law, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) particularly relies on the criterion of ‘effective control’ in order to affirm the extraterritorial
applicability of human rights. See, ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey, Preliminary Objections (Grand
Chamber), 23 February 1995, paras. 61–64; ECtHR, O¨calan v. Turkey, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 12
May 2005, para. 91; ECtHR, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. UK, Admissibility Decision, 30 June 2009, paras.
87–88. Contrary to the ECHR, the wording of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) is more ambiguous, as its Article 2(1) requires a state party to ‘respect and ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights’ set out in the convention.
However, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) has affirmed the possible extraterritorial application in
several instances. See, most prominently, HRC, General Comment No. 31: Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 26 May 2004, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13,
para. 10; HRC, Concluding Observations: United States of America, 2006, UN Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3,
para. 10; HRC, Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay (Communication No. 52/1979), 29 July 1981, UN Doc. CCPR/
C/13/D/52/1979, para. 12. Finally, the rights and freedoms in the American Convention on Human
Rights must be respected and ensured ‘to all persons subject to their [the state parties’] jurisdiction’
(Article 1). See, e.g., Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Armando Alejandre, Jr., et al. v.
Republic of Cuba, Case Report No. 86/99, 29 September 1999, para. 23.
132 International Court of Justice (ICJ), Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226, para. 25; ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136, para. 106. See also Orna
Ben-Naftali and Yuval Shany, ‘Living in denial: the application of human rights in the Occupied
Territories’, in Israel Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2003–2004, pp. 103–105.
133 Brian Hutchinson, ‘Assignment Kandahar: checkpoint 5-1’, in National Post, 10 August 2010; Mandy
Clark, ‘Afghan checkpoints key in battle for Kandahar’, in CBS News, 3 August 2010.
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actual target of enemy attacks.134 This raises the question whether the use of force at
vehicle checkpoints is governed by the paradigm of hostilities, or, given that they at
least partially if not primarily also amount to security measures, by the paradigm
of law enforcement, or both. A similar ambiguity may be present in the cases of
convoys or patrols and house searches.
In Afghanistan, as mentioned before, IHL applies in the entire territory,
irrespective of where fighting is taking place.135 Thus it potentially also applies to
and regulates checkpoints. Although IHL makes no explicit mention of check-
points there is no doubt that parties to an armed conflict are allowed to set up
checkpoints and to carry out similar security measures such as house searches
under that law. Some rules of IHL implicitly include the establishment of check-
points as security measures. In international armed conflicts, for instance, IHL
allows for security and control measures with regard to protected persons136 and, in
the case of occupation, requires an occupying power to take measures to restore
and ensure public order and safety.137 In non-international armed conflicts, the
possible legal basis for checkpoints will mostly stem from domestic law. What is
more, in the particular context of Afghanistan, the resolutions of the UN Security
Council permit the use of ‘all necessary measures’ to address, inter alia, the security
concerns in Afghanistan.138
Moreover, in accordance with the principle of distinction, military op-
erations related to the conduct of hostilities shall only be directed against legitimate
military objectives and consequently attacks shall not be directed at civilians or
civilian objects.139 At the same time, it is accepted that hostilities and related mili-
tary operations may affect civilians, which is why the latter ‘shall enjoy general
protection against dangers arising from military operations’.140 From this it would
follow, a majore ad minus, that, since IHL permits security measures in certain
situations and even military operations related to hostilities that may affect civi-
lians, under IHL it must also be possible to set up checkpoints affecting civilians, as
long as they do not constitute a direct attack against them and comply with other
humanitarian rules.
134 See, e.g., ‘Rebuilding an Afghan military checkpoint’, in OUT On The Porch, 29 November 2010, avail-
able at: http://outontheporch.org/2010/11/29/rebuilding-an-afghan-military-checkpoint/ (last visited
22 March 2011).
135 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic´, above note 7, paras. 68 and 69; ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul
Akayesu, above note 27, para. 635.
136 See Article 27(4) of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
137 See Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907.
138 See, in particular, UN Security Council resolution 1943 of 13 October 2010, and UN Security Council
resolution 1890 of 8 October 2009. For the mandate of ISAF, see UN Security Council resolution 1386 of
20 December 2001 and UN Security Council resolution 1510 of 13 October 2003.
139 See Articles 48, 51(2), and 52(2) of Additional Protocol I; and Article 13(2) of Additional Protocol II. See
also J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 44, Rules 1 and 7. For a commentary on attacks,
see Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, and B. Zimmermann (eds), above note 80, paras. 4783 and 1882, defining
attacks as simply referring to ‘the use of armed force to carry out a military operation’.
140 See Article 51(1) of Additional Protocol I and Article 13(1) of Additional Protocol II. See also Y. Sandoz,
C. Swinarski, and B. Zimmermann (eds), above note 80, paras. 1935–1936 and 4761–4771.
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The decision whether the use of force at (vehicle) checkpoints is governed
by the standards of the law enforcement paradigm or by those of the paradigm of
hostilities should be made by relying on the principle of lex specialis, according
to which the rules offering a more detailed and specific regulation should take
precedence.141 Consequently, if it is clear that fighters with a continuous combat
function or civilians who are directly participating in hostilities are approaching a
checkpoint or a convoy, they are legitimate military objectives and hence may be
targeted in accordance with the special rules relative to the conduct of hostilities.142
However, outside the conduct of hostilities – for instance, when the Afghan, ISAF,
or OEF forces exercise authority or power over persons protected against direct
attacks at checkpoints or during house searches, or act in individual self-defence, or
when the status of the person in question is doubtful – the use of force is governed
by the law enforcement paradigm, that is, human rights law and also IHL.143 IHL
governing non-international armed conflicts prohibits the killing of persons not
directly participating in hostilities and those hors de combat.144 Outside the conduct
of hostilities, however, IHL and its general principles do not provide sufficient
guidelines regarding the legitimate use of force in security operations related to a
non-international armed conflict. Recourse to human rights law in order to de-
scribe the modalities of the use of force may thus be justified.145
While the distinction in accordance with the lex specialis principle seems
straightforward from a legal perspective, in practice there may be situations where
it is admittedly much harder to evaluate which paradigm takes precedence. In the
case of an approaching car failing to slow down, or even accelerating towards a
(vehicle) checkpoint, it will be very difficult – if not altogether unrealistic – to as-
sess whether the driver is a fighter, a civilian directly participating in hostilities, or a
civilian protected against direct attack, and thus whether the rules on the conduct
of hostility or the more restrictive law enforcement standards apply. The decision
to resort to potentially lethal force has to be made within a few seconds only. If,
for instance, the first sign (to stop) is 200 metres away from the checkpoint and a
car arrives at approximately 90 km/h, a soldier has only instants to go through
escalation of force procedures and to decide whether or not to resort to potentially
141 Nils Melzer, ‘Law enforcement and the conduct of hostilities’, in T. D. Gill and D. Fleck, above note 131,
p. 42.
142 Ibid., pp. 43 and 44.
143 N. Melzer, above note 130, pp. 174–175 and 277. For an argument that checkpoints in occupied territory
are governed by domestic law and human rights law, see Marco Sasso`li, ‘Legislation and maintenance of
public order and civil life by occupying powers’, in European Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, No. 4,
2005, pp. 665–666. Afghanistan ratified the ICCPR of 23 March 1976 on 24 April 1983 and it is thus
binding for all Afghan forces maintaining a checkpoint. For Coalition forces, the applicable human rights
obligations will depend on the treaties that they have ratified, which raises the question whether and to
what degree these human rights instruments are applicable extraterritorially. In addition, status and
rights of ISAF are detailed in the ‘Military technical agreement: between the International Security Force
(ISAF) and the interim administration of Afghanistan (“Interim Administration”)’ of 4 January 2002, in
International Legal Materials, Vol. 41, No. 5, 2002, p. 1032.
144 See Common Article 3; Article 4(2)(a) of Additional Protocol II; J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck,
above note 44, Rule 89.
145 See O. Ben-Naftali and Y. Shany, above note 132, pp. 104–105.
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lethal force. However, it seems questionable whether in such a scenario the stan-
dards of human rights law and IHL really differ that much.
As described above, IHL requires that everything feasible must be done
to verify that the targets are fighters or civilians directly participating in hostilities
(i.e. military objectives). Only if a careful assessment leaves no doubt about the
status of the person as a legitimate military objective may they be directly targeted
in accordance with the rules relative to the conduct of hostilities. If doubt remains,
or if it is concluded that an approaching car and/or its occupants are not a military
objective, the use of potentially lethal force is governed by law enforcement stan-
dards. In accordance with human rights law – provided it applies146 – potentially
lethal force against an approaching car can only be used if it presents an imminent
threat under the circumstances of the given situation. The use of force must then be
strictly necessary to protect troops (of a convoy or manning a checkpoint) or any
other person from serious injury or death, or to arrest or to prevent the escape of a
person suspected of having committed a serious crime.147 In addition to the cri-
terion that the use of force must be proportionate to the acute threat posed, a
deprivation of life is also considered ‘arbitrary’ if reasonable precautionary mea-
sures could have avoided or minimized the use of force.148 These precautions in-
clude, inter alia, warnings and giving the opportunity to surrender,149 adequate
equipment,150 and training.151
Escalation of force procedures, which seemingly already contain a vast
array of non-lethal precautionary measures,152 are thus very important, and are
146 See above note 131.
147 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/ser.L/V/
II.116, Doc. 5 rev 1 corr., 22 October 2002, paras. 86–92; Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, above note 64, para. 32; HRC, Suarez de Guerrero v. Colombia, No. 45/
1979, 31 March 1982, CCPR/C/15/D/45/1997, para. 13.2.
148 See, e.g., HRC, Suarez de Guerrero v. Colombia, above note 147, paras. 13.2–3. While similar, the ECHR
has set out a slightly different system. Article 2(2) of the ECHR is violated if a deprivation of life is not
‘absolutely necessary’ to achieve one of the listed justification purposes. Like the other human rights
systems, the ECHR also requires that the use of force is proportionate and that precautions be taken in
order to ‘avoid or minimise, to the greatest extent possible’ any risk to life or the recourse to lethal force.
See, e.g., ECtHR, Case of Ergi v. Turkey, No. 66/1997/850/1057, 28 July 1998, paras. 79–81, stating that
government forces setting up an ambush in the vicinity of a village, and thus exposing the villagers to the
risk of crossfire, should have taken adequate precautions. For the requirements on the organization
and control of an anti-terrorist operation, see ECtHR, McCann and others v. The United Kingdom,
No. 17/1994/464/545, 27 September 1995, paras. 194 and 202–213.
149 HRC, Suarez de Guerrero v. Colombia, above note 147, para. 13.2.
150 ECtHR, Case of Gu¨lec¸ v. Turkey, No. 54/1997/838/1044, 27 July 1998, para. 71.
151 EctHR, McCann and others v. The United Kingdom, above note 148, paras. 211–212.
152 Escalation of force (EoF) procedures seem to include, inter alia, standardized warning signs, speed
bumps, spike/tyre-shredder strips, pen flares, traffic cones, and bull horns. See, e.g., John Stevens,
‘A vignette: Coalition casualties, vehicle control points/cordons & CIVCAS’, in COIN Common Sense,
Vol. 1, No. 1, February 2010, ISAF-Afghanistan, p. 6. See also Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL),
Escalation of Force Handbook: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 07-21, July 2007. The need for more
non-lethal weapons in the context of Afghanistan has recently been acknowledged by a senior US Marine
commander. See Dan Lamothe, ‘2-star supports more use of nonlethal weapons’, in Marine Corps
Times, 2 February 2011, available at: http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2011/02/marine-corps-
afghanistan-tasers-nonlethal-weapons-020110/ (last visited 22 March 2011). For a compilation of
available and future non-lethal weapons, see DoD Non-Lethal Weapons Program, Non-Lethal Weapons
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feasible precautions that help to assess whether or not an approaching car re-
presents a threat that may be answered with potentially lethal force.
New technologies on the battlefield: the use of drones
in Afghanistan
The use of drones in Afghanistan – most significantly combat drones that are
able to launch attacks in remote areas – has received much media attention.153
Unmanned aerial vehicles are a means of decreasing the risk to one’s own forces
and of reaching even the most remote locations in the mountainous area of
Afghanistan. Their increased use, often associated with incidental civilian casual-
ties, has triggered debate, mostly related to the legality of how they are being
used.154
Drones, which are usually operated hundreds or thousands of miles away
from their actual operative location,155 can remain in the air for around twenty
hours and provide live videos (including infrared and synthetic aperture radar).156
Initially designed for surveillance purposes, the combat models currently used
(the MQ-1 Predator and the MQ-9 Reaper) may be equipped with 100-pound
Hellfire missiles and, in the case of the Reaper, even with 500-pound bombs.157
Currently, the decision to launch an attack remains with the ‘pilot’, who reportedly
needs to go through up to seventeen steps of approval before being allowed to fire
a missile.158 However, new challenges could arise if more automated programs are
introduced, potentially no longer requiring a human being to make the decision.
Considering the weaponry of the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper
drones, it is difficult to imagine their utility as law enforcement tools outside
for Today’s Operations, 2011, available at: https://www.jnlwp.usmc.mil/misc/publications/AR2011.PDF
(last visited 22 March 2011).
153 See, e.g., Jane Mayer, ‘The predator war: what are the risks of the C.I.A.’s covert drone program?’, in The
New Yorker, 26 October 2009, available at: http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/
091026fa_fact_mayer (last visited 22 March 2011).
154 Note that drones are not outlawed as a weapons platform. It is mainly their use for targeted killings that
has been the subject of debate. See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions, above note 66, p. 24. For a discussion of their legality under international law see,
e.g., Chatham House, International Law and the Use of Drones: Summary of the International Law
Discussion Group Meeting Held at Chatham House on Thursday, 21 October 2010, Mary Ellen O’Connell
and Michael N. Schmitt (speakers), and Elizabeth Wilmshurst (chair).
155 Christopher Drew, ‘Drones are weapons of choice in fighting Qaeda’, in The New York Times, 16 March
2009.
156 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Precision attack and international humanitarian law’, in International Review of the
Red Cross, Vol. 87, No. 859, 2005, p. 448.
157 See US Air Force, MQ-1B Predator, Factsheet, 20 July 2010, available at: http://www.af.mil/information/
factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=122; and US Air Force, MQ-9 Reaper, Factsheet, 18 August 2010, available
at: http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=6405 (both last visited 22 March 2011);
Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘The international law of drones’, in The American Society of International Law
Insights, Vol. 14, No. 36, 12 November 2010; Matthias Gebauer et al., ‘Accident-prone wonder weapons:
Afghanistan war logs reveal shortcomings of US drones’, in Der Spiegel, 27 July 2010.
158 C. Drew, above note 155.
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situations of armed conflict.159 If drones are used on the ‘battlefield’, attacks must
comply with the pertinent rules of IHL as outlined in the present article (i.e. dis-
tinction, proportionality, and precautions), just as any other battlefield delivery
system not explicitly outlawed by IHL.
While the drones’ technology may permit enhanced aerial surveillance and
precise attacks, thus potentially enhancing compliance with the principles of pre-
cautions in attack and proportionality, the question remains how the distinction
between civilian and military objectives is to be achieved in a context in which it
may be very challenging to gather reliable intelligence. This becomes particularly
worrying when drones are used to target persons figuring on a targeting list160 or to
identify people as directly participating in hostilities. For instance, can a person
digging in the vicinity of a road really be distinguished as a person planting an IED
solely based on a video analysis?
The oft-criticized fact that the person controlling the UAV is far away
from the battlefield eventually does not constitute a challenge for IHL.161 However,
some authors caution that the use of drones may lead to a ‘“Playstation” mentality’
if operators are untrained in IHL and uninformed by the ‘risks and rigors of battle’,
and that the greater security of the attacking forces could lead to a more ‘light-
hearted’ resort to lethal force.162
Conclusion
The prolonged conflict in Afghanistan has not led to a visible change in IHL. Initial
calls for a new or reformed legal framework have faded but significant challenges
remain. As far as the humanitarian rules relating to the conduct of hostilities
are concerned, currently the greatest challenge derives from the blurred lines
of distinction that are so characteristic of asymmetric conflict scenarios.
Notwithstanding, thus far the fundamental precepts of the humanitarian legal
order have not been put into question. Despite all discussion about IHL’s potential
159 Operations and cross-border attacks in Pakistan present manifold challenging questions not only from a
human rights or IHL angle but also from a jus ad bellum perspective that are beyond the scope of this
article. See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, above
note 66, pp. 10–15 and 25.
160 See Chatham House, above note 154, p. 5, where O’Connell notes that there are about six to seven
casualties per attack, out of which usually only one person was on the hit list. This also raises concern
about how those planning or deciding upon an attack carry out proportionality assessments. For an
argument that the advanced technological capabilities of UAVs allowing for virtual ‘persistent surveil-
lance’ (and thus making more relevant information available) lead to stricter requirements for targeting
decisions, proportionality, and precautions, see J. M. Beard, above note 110, especially pp. 420, 428–442,
and 444.
161 In cases where the drone is operated, in the context of an armed conflict, by a civilian contractor or by
intelligence agencies (e.g. the CIA), the pilot would participate directly in hostilities and could poten-
tially be targeted. In addition, the pilot’s participation could raise issues regarding criminal liability and
detention status.
162 See most prominently Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
above note 66, pp. 24–25.
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need of reform, almost ten years after the beginning of Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan in October 2001 no compelling reform proposal for the
rules relating to the conduct of hostilities has yet been made. On the contrary,
especially during the second phase of the conflict the strategy of the international
military forces in Afghanistan was focused on a strict adherence to existing rules, in
order to achieve the overall strategic priority of winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of
the Afghan population.
Nevertheless, controversy has increasingly arisen over the interpretation of
existing rules. As conflict structures become more and more diffuse, legal certainty
and clarity of humanitarian law prescriptions become ever more important. It is no
coincidence that a number of so-called expert clarification processes with regard to
the notion of direct participation in hostilities or air and missile warfare have been
organized in recent years. All of these processes have touched upon important
conduct of hostilities issues. At the same time, a number of long-standing ques-
tions and ambiguities, inherent for example in the proportionality principle or the
definition of military objectives, remain unresolved and insufficiently discussed.
Of course, some of these issues are difficult and, it seems, eternally disputed.
Unsurprisingly, these controversies have been part and parcel of the modern
humanitarian legal framework almost since its birth. Many can be traced back to
the negotiations leading to the adoption of Additional Protocol I in 1977.
Increasingly asymmetric conflict structures have not made their solution any easier
in 2011, but the need for legal clarity in relation to the conduct of hostilities is
clearly increasing.
46
R. Geiß and M. Siegrist – Has the armed conflict in Afghanistan affected the rules on the conduct
of hostilities?
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383111000191
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 17:35:58, subject to the Cambridge Core
